This article studies the implications of consumption taxation on capital accumulation in a one-sector endogenous growth model with …nite horizons. A tax on consumption, when tax revenues are lump-sum rebated to consumers, redistributes income between living generations and future, still unborn, generations, and therefore depresses aggregate consumption and raises saving, stimulating capital accumulation and economic growth. If however the resources from taxation are used for …nancing unproductive public spending, the e¤ect of the consumption tax on the endogenous growth rate disappears as no intergenerational redistribution of income occurs. Finally, a consumption tax hike accompanied by a compensatory reduction of public debt increases long-run economic growth and reduces the consumption-output ratio. Our results on consumption taxation di¤er substantially from those obtained within the endogenous growth literature.
Introduction
The developments of the "new growth theory" have stimulated the research investigation into the e¤ects of tax policies on the endogenously determined growth rate of the economy. For example, the contributions of Barro (1990) , Rebelo (1991) , Barro-Sala-i-Martin (1992) , Pecorino (1993) , Devereux-Love (1994) , Stokey-Rebelo (1995) , Turnovsky (1996) , Uhlig-Yanagawa (1996) , Mendoza-Milesi Ferretti-Asea (1997 ), Milesi Ferretti-Roubini (1998 and Turnovsky (2000) , among others, have recently examined this issue. 1 The current policy debates on the proper tax incentives capable of stimulating economic growth end up in several cases with the proposal of substituting to some extent income tax with consumption tax with the aim of exempting savings from the burden of double taxation and enhancing capital accumulation as well as output growth; see, for example, Bradford (1986) and McClure-Zodrow (1996) . 2 However, according to the endogenous growth literature that has been developed so far, a tax on consumption either does not in ‡uence output growth at all or alternatively reduces it.
A consumption tax exerts no e¤ects on the self-propelling economic growth rate when in…nite-horizon one-sector growth models with exogenous labour supply are considered. 3 In such contexts this type of tax works like a lump-sum tax. The inability of a consumption tax to a¤ect growth depends on the fact that it does not alter the optimal decision about the allocation of present and future consumption due to the in…nite horizon of the representative agent, as it produces no e¤ects whatsoever on the relative price of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow. 4 Note that the growth rate of output remains constant as the consumption tax varies, whatever the use of the tax revenues is. 5 1 An attempt to survey the consequences of di¤erent types of taxation within endogenous growth models can be found in Xu (1994) . For a general perspective concerning the consequences of …scal policy on long-run growth, see the survey of Tanzi-Zee (1997) . 2 This proposal, which is not new but has a long tradition in the history of economic thought, was suggested, among the early proponents, by Fisher (1937) and Kaldor (1955) . 3 See, for example, Barro (1990) , Rebelo (1990) , Barro-Sala-i-Martin (1992) , and Xu (1994) . 4 In other terms the return on consumption is not in ‡uenced by the tax, because of the Ricardian debt-neutrality. 5 The above results have also a correspondence within neoclassical growth models. In the exogenous growth approach with inelastic leisure-labour choice, a permanent increase in the consumption tax rate is neutral for the steady state capital intensity (determined by the modi…ed golden rule), consumption and the short-run rate of capital accumulation, provided that revenues Permanent e¤ects of consumption taxation on growth can be found, even though not necessarily, when an endogenous labour-leisure choice is introduced in models with in…nitely-lived consumers. In such a case, the tax distorts the consumption-leisure decision. A consumption tax hike gives rise to substitution and income e¤ects, and the net equilibrium consequence on leisure is obtained by weighing the two e¤ects. Devereux-Love (1994) and Milesi Ferretti-Roubini (1998) , for example, discover that the tax reduces the balanced growth rate, because of the net increase in leisure (stemming from a substitution e¤ect greater than the income e¤ect).
6 However, Stokey-Rebelo (1995) , incorporating some simplifying assumptions, show that the growth e¤ect of consumption taxation disappears, also when the tax revenues are not rebated to consumers, because income and substitution e¤ects cancel themselves out leaving leisure una¤ected.
These conclusions, while being rigourously founded, are in some sense counterintuitive, especially when labour supply is inelastic, because cases could exist in which the consumption tax per se distorts the consumption-saving decision, crowding out consumption and stimulating saving, 7 when consumers are lumpsum compensated for the expenditure tax, and therefore implying faster capital accumulation and higher rate of output expansion. This intuition is supported by two pieces of empirical evidence o¤ered by and Lewis-Seidman (1998) , on the one side, and Mendoza-Milesi FerrettiAsea (1997) , on the other. In the and Lewis-Seidman (1998) papers, it is shown by using U.S. data that a conversion of an income tax to a consumption tax can increase aggregate saving even if the propensity to save of each consumer is maintained constant, because of the variation in the propensity to save among consumers. Mendoza-Milesi Ferretti-Asea (1997) …nd, by using a cross-country panel of 18 OECD countries, that the consumption tax and the investment rate are positively related, whereas consumption taxation is not a statistically-signi…cant determinant of growth, most probably because outliers represent a serious problem of the tax are distributed as lump-sum subsidies to consumers. If the revenues of the tax are used to …nance unproductive government spending, we register only a steady-state reduction of consumption and again no e¤ects on long-run capital intensity and capital accumulation along the transition path (see Abel-Blanchard, 1983) . 6 When an endogenous labour supply is introduced in neoclassical growth models, a consumption tax, if tax revenues are rebated to consumers as lump-sum transfers, reduces the long-run capital stock and labour by the same amount in percentage terms, implying that along the transition path the e¤ect on the growth rate of output is negative.
7 Naturally we are assuming that the substitution e¤ect activated by the tax shock outweighs the income e¤ect.
in the growth regressions.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the consequences of the consumption tax on capital formation and economic development through a simple one-sector endogenous growth model based on the uncertain lifetimes approach of Blanchard (1985) . 8 Labour supply is considered inelastic so as to eliminate the intratemporal consumption-leisure distortion brought about by the consumption tax and to allow us to focus solely on the e¤ect of the shock on the relative price of consumption today and tomorrow.
The analysis of consumption taxation has not yet received too much attention within setups based on …nite lives. One exception is represented by AuerbachKotliko¤ (1987) , where the consequences of di¤erent types of taxes are investigated through a Samuelson-Diamond OLG neoclassical growth framework with an elastic labour supply. In the simulated model they show that, despite the labor-leisure choice distortion introduced by a non-unit price of consumption, the indirect tax spurs investment and temporarily growth.
We discover that in the endogenous growth model with new generations continuously entering the economy, consumption taxation stimulates saving as consumption is crowded out, allowing for more investment and permanently higher output growth rates, when current tax revenues are lump-sum rebated to currently living consumers. The reason for such a result depends on the fact that the consumption tax a¤ects aggregate saving through the intergenerational redistribution of income that is carried out by the distribution of tax revenues. In fact, a consumption tax is not neutral as a higher tax rate implies greater lumpsum transfers distributed by the government to consumers. A redistribution of wealth between young and older generations occurs, leading to higher aggregate saving and capital accumulation as young people save relatively more than older consumers. 9 If, instead, the resources from taxation were used for …nancing unproductive public spending, the net e¤ect of the consumption tax on the growth rate would vanish, because according to this public-spending …nancing scheme, income is not redistributed between living generations and generations that are still unborn. 8 Other papers have already plugged Blanchard's approach into endogenous growth frameworks -see, for example, Alogoskou…s-Van der Ploeg (1990), Saint-Paul (1992) , Van der PloegAlogoskou…s (1994) , Bertola (1996) and Reinhart (1999) .
9 Therefore in our model the positive e¤ect of the consumption tax on saving and economic growth is due to demographic heterogeneity of households, while in the and LewisSeidman (1998) experiments this positive e¤ect depends on the income heterogeneity among households.
Finally, a consumption tax hike accompanied by a compensatory reduction of public debt increases long-run economic growth and reduces the share of consumption in national income. This experiment generates a transitional adjustment of the economy, characterized by a moderate short-run variability of output growth and consumption to output ratio.
The model
Consider a real economy populated by …nitely-lived consumers, competitive …rms and the government. Time is continuous and agents are endowed with perfect foresight.
The demand-side of the economy is modelled according to the overlappinggenerations model of Blanchard (1985) without an operative intergenerational bequest motive. Individuals face uncertainty on the duration of their lives, since they face, when they are alive, a constant probability of death¸. In every instant of time, a large cohort is born. The size of each cohort is normalized to one. Population, composed of the cohorts of all ages, remains constant, since the birth rate is assumed to equal the death rate.
10 Labour is supplied inelastically and hence normalized to one.
We assume that the instantaneous utility function of consumers is logarithmic. The consumer born at time s maximizes the expected lifetime welfare
subject to the individual ‡ow budget constraint
where
q (s; t) denote at time t consumption, non-human wealth, non-interest income and lump-sum taxes of a consumer born at time s · t, respectively; r(t) denote the interest rate at time t; µ and ¿ c are the exogenous rate of time preference and the constant consumption tax rate, respectively. Tildes denote individual variables.
The budget constraint (2) incorporates the hypothesis that consumers receive an actuarially fair premium¸» f (s; t) from the life insurance company and give all their wealth to the life insurance company contingent on their death.
By integrating the budget constraint (2) forward and by imposing the transversality condition precluding Ponzi games, we obtain the consumer's intertemporal budget constraint
where » h (s; t) represents human wealth, i.e. the present discounted value of expected future income net of lump-sum taxes.
The …rst order conditions for the individual maximization problem yield
and thus from the consumer's present value budget constraint
Note that the introduction of a proportional tax on consumption decreases the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, because total wealth should be de ‡ated, in order to be expressed in terms of consumption, by the price of one unit consumption, given by (1 + ¿ c ).
After having aggregated the solution of the individual maximization program over all the cohorts, 11 we obtain the Blanchard-Yaari law of motion of consumption, and the dynamic equations of aggregate non-human and human wealth :
11 Each aggregate variable is de…ned as
where » z (s; t) indicates a generic individual variable. Therefore capital letters denote aggregate variables of the corresponding lower-case letters with tilde.
:
Since the rate of change of aggregate consumption depends, amongst other factors, on the level of non-human wealth, it is also a¤ected by the consumption tax rate, which decreases one unit of wealth by
, because of the non-unit price of consumption.
12
Non-human wealth of consumers consists of physical capital and stock of government debt
where K(t) and B(t) denote the capital stock and the stock of public debt, respectively.
The production side of the economy is composed of many identical competitive …rms. Firms produce output by using the following production function
where A is a positive constant, L(t) is labour and K ¤ (t) is the average capital stock of the economy. K ¤ (t) represents a factor of production externality given to the individual …rm, due to a "learning by doing" mechanism (as in Romer, 1986) . Technology (7) guarantees the existence of an endogenously driven growth rate of output, since it shows constant returns to scale with respect to aggregate capital stock, i.e. the accumulating factor.
The representative …rm solves the following intertemporal optimization problem
subject to (7). ¦(t) represents the present discounted value of net pro…ts.
12 The reason for having this e¤ect in the dynamic equation of aggregate consumption is due to the di¤erent rates of return on human and non-human wealth. In the case of an in…nite horizon (¸= 0), the e¤ect of the consumption tax rate disappears from equation (5). 13 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that capital does not depreciate and all capital accumulation (decumulaton) occurs at a continuous rate and does not incur adjustment costs.
The …rst order conditions for the maximum entail
Equation (9a) implies that -once the equilibrium condition on the labour market, i.e. L(t) = 1, and the consistency requirement about K ¤ , i.e. K ¤ (t) = K(t), are accounted for-the return on investment is constant, since we have
This is the key element for having endogenous growth. Then, we have to consider the government instantaneous budget constraint given by
where G(t) represents government consumption. Equation (10) says that total public outlays, government spending plus interest on public debt are …nanced through lump-sum taxes, taxes on consumption and the issuance of new debt. The solvency of the government is guaranteed by imposing the following transversality condition
Finally, the resources constraint of the economy must be considered
Equation (12) states that the full employment output must be equal to the aggregate demand, given by consumption, public spending and private investment, i.e. capital accumulation. The full macroeconomic equilibrium for the economy is obtained by combining the optimal conditions for consumers and …rms, together with the relevant accumulation equations. For simplicity, we can divide all variables by national product and denote them by lower-case letters. After substituting out the capital-output ratio and the interest rate, and dropping the time index, then the model can be expressed in compact form as
where°is the growth rate of output (equal to the growth rate of capital).
14 We assume that ®A > µ, i.e. the economy is considered to be dynamically e¢cient.
Note that, when no consumption externalities due to …nite horizons and no operative bequests hypotheses ( i.e.¸= 0) exist, the model reduces to the in…nite-horizon representative-consumer economy and the consumption tax drops out of the system (13).
E¤ects of consumption taxation
Our analysis will consider the macroeconomic e¤ects of the following consumption tax experiments: i) an increase in ¿ c when tax revenues are lump-sum rebated to consumers; ii) an increase in ¿ c when resources from consumption taxation are used for …nancing public spending; iii) an increase in ¿ c when the revenues collected by consumption taxation are employed to reduce public debt. i) increase in ¿ c accompanied by a compensatory reduction in q In the present experiment, public debt to output ratio and government expenditure to output ratio remain constant at level b = a b and g = a g , respectively. This implies that q is solved residually from equation (13c).
After using equation (13b) to eliminate c and : c (by taking the time derivative) from equation (13a), we obtain the following nonlinear di¤erential equation with constant coe¢cients
14 Equation (11) -expressed in per output terms-must also be included in the compact model (13):
The balanced growth solution can be obtained by setting :°= 0 in (14) and solving the implied quadratic equation. There are two positive solutions for the growth rate, given by
and
where the overbar denotes the long-run equilibrium growth rate . It is straightforward to show that 15 Consequently, there are no transitional dynamics in°(and hence in c) as in response to any shock the output growth rate immediately jumps to its new equilibrium value.
INSERT FIGURE 1 Solution (15a) for the growth rate can be easily employed for evaluating the consequence of the consumption tax on the growth rate. The e¤ect of an increase in ¿ c is given by
An increase in the consumption tax raises the endogenous growth rate of output unambiguously and reduces the consumption-output ratio, as d
The economy instantaneously jumps from P to P' in Figure   15 In addition, note that _°2 corresponds to a negative share of consumption over income. 16 It is not di¢cult to ascertain that _ c (1 + ¿ c ) increases.
1.
The motivation for such a result is to be found in the hypothesis of overlappinggenerations with new entries combined with the tax revenue distribution scheme adopted. In this context the consumption tax is capable of permanently a¤ecting saving behaviour. When there are …nite lives with new births, a consumption tax a¤ects the saving-consumption decision at aggregate level. Since young people save more than old people, a redistribution of wealth occurs among generations through lump-sum rebates of the tax revenues, in particular between the living generations and the still unborn generations; the current generation receives part of the lump-sum bene…ts in the form of lower lump-sum taxes. Savings and therefore growth are raised by the tax rate hike. 17 Another way of looking at these e¤ects is the following: the rise in consumption tax brings about a reduction of the return on consumption at aggregate level, 18 inducing people to consume less and save relatively more, therefore leading to more capital accumulation. Hence the intertemporal perfect arbitrage condition between investment and consumption returns is re-established only through an increase in the growth rate.
Note that the e¤ect of consumption tax on economic growth diminishes as long as _°1 asymptotically approaches the value of ®A¡µ when¸vanishes. The positive enhancing e¤ect of the consumption tax over the economy's rate of expansion disappears in the limit case of an in…nite horizon economy (¸= 0 and _°1 = ®A ¡ µ) -con…rming the results of Barro (1990) , Rebelo (1990) , Barro and Sala-iMartin (1992) , and Xu (1994)-as debt-neutrality holds and the intergenerational redistributive consequences of the tax disappear. 17 This result has something in common with Bertola (1996) and Uhlig-Yanagawa (1996) , where it is shown, by using a Blanchard-type overlapping generations model and a DiamondSamuelson type two-overlapping generations setup respectively, that a tax on capital income stimulates long-run growth. The driving force behind their result is identical to the one in our analysis: a tax on capital income redistributes wealth from the old to the young and thus stimulates savings. 18 The return on aggregate consumption is given by:
ii) increase in ¿ c accompanied by a compensatory increase in g In this experiment the government keeps the budget in equilibrium by adjusting the public expenditure to income ratio, rather than q. By substituting out the government budget constraint for eliminating g into equation (13b), we obtain
After using equation (16) into equation (13a), the following di¤erential equation is obtained
When :°= 0, the unique meaningful solution for the long-run growth rate to the quadratic equation in (17) is
According to expression (18), when the government budget is balanced through the endogenous adjustment of public spending to income ratio, long-run economic growth becomes independent of the consumption tax. As the tax revenues are not rebated in a lump-sum fashion but used for government consumption, the abovementioned redistribution of income among the existing younger generation and other generations is absent and so is the e¤ect on savings as well as on output growth. The increase in g (induced by the rise in ¿ c ) fully crowds out private consumption so as to leave capital accumulation,
iii) increase in ¿ c accompanied by a compensatory adjustment of b When the government budget is balanced through the adjustment of public debt to output ratio, a tax rule that stabilizes government debt must be considered. We consider the following tax rule
where ² >0. Equation (19) satis…es the government solvency condition if " > ®A ¡°. We assume, without sacri…cing the generality of the results, that the stronger condition " > ®A is satis…ed. The dynamic system can be expressed as the following system of nonlinear di¤erential equations
where and ©, both positive, have been de…ned before.
The determination of the equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2 . Here, we plot the :°= 0 schedule, which shows the public debt-ouput ratio that guarantees a constant growth rate for each value of°. 19 In Figure 2 , we also plot the 
Equation (20a') is quadratic, having a positive intercept on the vertical axis and intersecting the horizontal axis twice, at°1 and°2. These two points of intersection are given by the expressions (15a) and (15b) by setting a b= 0. The :°= 0 locus has a minimum at point°¤ = 2 . The slope of the constant output growth locus could be either positive or negative, depending on whether°exceeds or falls short of°¤. Notice that, as for°2 (°1;°2) the corresponding b is negative and for°¸°2 the share of consumption over income is negative, the only section of the :°= 0 locus that we are interested in is that corresponding to the interval [0,°1] for the growth rate. 20 The equation of the
This schedule has positive intercept on the vertical axis -as we can reasonably assume
. This is the case assumed, without a¤ecting the qualitative results,
b= 0 locus is negatively-sloped.
INSERT FIGURE 2
The steady-state equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two loci at point P. The equibrium point Q can be ruled out as it does not satisfy the stability conditions and corresponds to a negative consumption-output ratio.
The stability of equilibrium in model (20) can be investigated as follows. By linearizing the di¤erential equations (20a) and (20b) around the steady-state equilibrium, we can write the dynamic system in compact matrix form as · :°:
where overbar variables denote long-run values and
. In order to ensure saddle-point stability, the above Jacobian must have one positive eigenvalue associated with the jump variable,°, and one negative eigenvalue associated with the predetermined variable, b. The determinant of the Jacobian, equal to j J j= ¡[("+ _°¡ ®A)(¡2
, is negative for reasonable values of structural parameters, as the required condition for saddle-point stability.
22
The equation of the stable manifold is°=
where ¥ = j 12 1 ¡ j 11 =´1 ¡ j 22 j 21 < 0 and´1 < 0 denotes the stable eigenvalue of the Jacobian in (21). The saddle-path, depicted in Figure 3 , is negatively-sloped in the°-b space. 22 Notice that, in the neighborhoods of point Q, j 11 < 0 and hence saddle-point stability is not satis…ed. 23 Notice that the saddle-path is always negatively sloped regardless the sign of j 21 . In Figure   3 , also the linearized :°= 0 locus, whose slope isj 11 j 12 , and the linearized Figure 2 . The equilibrium moves from point P to point P'. This implies that higher consumption taxation increases economic growth and reduces both consumption and public debt to income ratios. 24 The intuition behind these results is straightforward. The greater tax revenues stemming from the rise in the consumption tax rate require a reduction of public debt to keep the government budget balanced. Therefore a redistribution of wealth among generations occurs, as government bonds are considered net wealth by current generations, which decreases aggregate consumption. This in turn stimulates national savings, spurring capital accumulation and output growth.
The equilibrium and the associated dynamics are illustrated in Figure 3 . As a rise in ¿ c results in a steady-state increase of the growth rate and a reduction of the ratio of government debt to output, the unexpected permanent …scal shock shifts the saddle-path upward to S'S', leading to an instantaneous jump of economic growth, which undershoots its new long-run equilibrium value. 25 The equilibrium moves suddenly from point P to point P 0 on the new saddle-path. At P 0 a government budget surplus occurs. Soon after the shock has taken place, the system converges monotonically to the new long-run equilibrium with a decumulation of government debt, a further rise in the growth rate and a reduction of consumption to national income ratio. 24 By taking the di¤erentials of equations (20) where j J j< 0 has been de…ned before. 25 The case of perverse-shooting seems implausible according to plausible structural parameter values.
Conclusions
In this article we have investigated the consequences of a consumption tax on the economy's rate of output expansion in an OLG endogenous growth setup with new entry.
We have discovered that consumption taxation reduces aggregate consumption and raises saving, stimulating capital accumulation and economic growth, when consumers are lump-sum compensated for the tax. Even if this result is consistent with the intuition, it is quite a new one in the literature that analyzes the e¤ects of taxes adopting one-sector endogenous growth models. The demographic framework and the scheme of distribution of the tax revenues represents the crucial elements for obtaining such a result. In fact our demographic structure fails to display the Ricardian debt-neutrality, so that the intertemporal pattern of net lump-sum taxes to individuals has real e¤ects.
Changes in the consumption tax necessary to …nance higher government consumption to output ratio produces no e¤ects on the output growth rate as the intergenerational restributive e¤ects seen in the case of lump-sum taxation disappear.
Moreover, we can observe that a balanced-budget reduction of public debt carried out through an increase in the consumption tax rate spurs capital accumulation and growth as the change in public debt redistributes wealth among generations, while consumption taxation is per se neutral. Under this tax experiment the economy is subject to transitional dynamics. The short-run e¤ects of consumption taxation on real growth and private consumption to national income ratio are smaller than the long-run e¤ects.
Finally, revenue-neutral proposals that aim at reducing output taxes in favour of expenditure taxes are successful in terms of growth stimuli, because the reduction of the distortions of the output tax, that works in the growth-enhancing direction, is accompanied by a neutral change of the consumption tax.
